no-regret algorithm
No-regret Algorithms for Fair Resource Allocation
We consider a fair resource allocation problem in the no-regret setting against an unrestricted adversary. The objective is to allocate resources equitably among several agents in an online fashion so that the difference of the aggregate $\alpha$-fair utilities of the agents achieved by an optimal static clairvoyant allocation and the online policy grows sublinearly with time. The problem inherits its difficulty from the non-separable nature of the global $\alpha$-fairness function. Previously, it was shown that no online policy could achieve a sublinear standard regret in this problem. In this paper, we propose an efficient online resource allocation policy, called Online Fair Allocation ($\texttt{OFA}$), that achieves sublinear $c_\alpha$-approximate regret with approximation factor $c_\alpha=(1-\alpha)^{-(1-\alpha)}\leq 1.445,$ for $0\leq \alpha < 1$. Our upper bound on the $c_\alpha$-regret for this problem exhibits a surprising \emph{phase transition} phenomenon -- transitioning from a power-law to a constant at the critical exponent $\alpha=\frac{1}{2}.$
Breaking the Moments Condition Barrier: No-Regret Algorithm for Bandits with Super Heavy-Tailed Payoffs
Despite a large amount of effort in dealing with heavy-tailed error in machine learning, little is known when moments of the error can become non-existential: the random noise $\eta$ satisfies Pr$\left[|\eta| > |y|\right] \le 1/|y|^{\alpha}$ for some $\alpha > 0$. We make the first attempt to actively handle such super heavy-tailed noise in bandit learning problems: We propose a novel robust statistical estimator, mean of medians, which estimates a random variable by computing the empirical mean of a sequence of empirical medians. We then present a generic reductionist algorithmic framework for solving bandit learning problems (including multi-armed and linear bandit problem): the mean of medians estimator can be applied to nearly any bandit learning algorithm as a black-box filtering for its reward signals and obtain similar regret bound as if the reward is sub-Gaussian. We show that the regret bound is near-optimal even with very heavy-tailed noise. We also empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, which further corroborates our theoretical results.
Strategizing against No-regret Learners
Deng, Yuan, Schneider, Jon, Sivan, Balusubramanian
How should a player who repeatedly plays a game against a no-regret learner strategize to maximize his utility? We study this question and show that under some mild assumptions, the player can always guarantee himself a utility of at least what he would get in a Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. When the no-regret learner has only two actions, we show that the player cannot get any higher utility than the Stackelberg equilibrium utility. But when the no-regret learner has more than two actions and plays a mean-based no-regret strategy, we show that the player can get strictly higher than the Stackelberg equilibrium utility. We provide a characterization of the optimal game-play for the player against a mean-based no-regret learner as a solution to a control problem. When the no-regret learner's strategy also guarantees him a no-swap regret, we show that the player cannot get anything higher than a Stackelberg equilibrium utility.